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Democracy Needs More Than Guilt

Stefanie Wetzel

At a widely anticipated lecture on April 24, sociologist Eva Illouz posed a provocative question: “Is Guilt Good for Democracy?” Speaking at Goethe University’s Forschungskolleg Humanwissenschaften Institute for Advanced Studies, she argued that guilt and shame have become central organizing principles of postwar liberal democracies.

Following an introduction by Johannes Völz, Professor of American Studies, Democracy, and Aesthetics at Goethe University Frankfurt, Illouz developed her argument through examples from Europe, the United States, and Australia, drawing on philosophy, sociology, and psychoanalysis. Her central claim was that while democratic societies require accountability and remembrance, a politics built on permanent structural guilt risks undermining the very idea of progress. Democracy, she argued, also depends on the possibility of forgiveness, moral growth, and political reconciliation.

As someone who moves between worlds – born into a Sephardi-Jewish family in Morocco, Eva Illouz moved to France at the age of 10 and today holds both Israeli and French nationality – it should come as little surprise that the world-renown sociologist began her lecture with two historical events that have a particular national relevance to Germany. Illouz opened with a quotation from U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who, speaking at the Munich Security Conference in February, declared: “We want allies who can defend themselves so that no adversary will ever be tempted to test our collective strength. This is why we do not want our allies to be shackled by guilt and shame.” Explaining why she chose this example, Illouz argued that guilt and shame have acquired a much broader political role than democratic self-criticism alone. As she put it, “in becoming the organizing principles of the past and the guides of the present, guilt and shame have done more than express democracies’ capacity for accountability. They constitute more than a weakness. In fact, I would go further than Rubio and say that they constitute a subversion of the politics of democracy and progressivism itself.”

From there, Illouz traced how collective guilt evolved from a mechanism of democratic accountability into a broader moral and political framework. A key symbolic moment, she argued, was former German chancellor Willy Brandt’s kneeling at the Warsaw Ghetto Memorial in 1970. Although Brandt had personally opposed Nazism, the gesture publicly enacted collective responsibility and became one of the defining symbols of democratic Germany. The act, she said, reflected a wider postwar transformation shaped by denazification, theological reflection, philosophical debate, reeducation programs, and Germany’s reintegration into the liberal international order. Out of the Holocaust and the Nuremberg Trials emerged a new political culture in which crimes against humanity were no longer seen merely as violations of national law but as offenses against humanity itself. This development fostered universal human rights, memorialization practices, and an understanding of democracy as a moral project aimed at preventing future barbarism.

Illouz then turned to thinkers such as Theodor W. Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Hannah Arendt, and Karl Jaspers, whose work expanded the concept of guilt beyond individual wrongdoing. In their analyses, responsibility became increasingly connected to social structures, Western civilization, and modernity itself. Colonialism, she argued, came to be interpreted through a moral lens similar to that applied to Nazism, while anti-colonial movements drew on the language of Nuremberg to condemn imperial rule. Human rights discourse, particularly from the 1970s onward, helped universalize these ideas and embed them in international institutions. “The consequence for the question that occupies me – that of guilt – is profound. Colonialism was no longer peripheral, but constitutive of European modernity.”

Contemporary theories, she continued, have pushed this development further. Concepts such as settler colonialism and Michael Rothberg’s notion of the “implicated subject” shift responsibility away from individual actions and toward structural positions, privilege, identity, and participation in systems of domination. Individuals may be considered complicit not because of what they have done, but because of the social structures from which they benefit. For Illouz, the implicated subject functions as an “analytical category supposed to help us understand the kind of society that makes the murders of George Floyd or Trayvon Martin possible.” It is, she continued, “a transmission belt of the new nation, occupying positions of power and privilege without being itself a direct agent of harm. It contributes to and benefits regimes of domination, even though they do not control such nations.” Such individuals are neither victims nor perpetrators, “but participants in histories and social formations that generate the positions of victim and perpetrator.”

In the final section of her lecture, Illouz moved from political philosophy to psychoanalysis, drawing on Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan to argue that guilt can become self-perpetuating. Rather than leading to resolution, reconciliation, or forgiveness, it may encourage endless self-scrutiny and moral self-condemnation. According to Illouz, this dynamic contributes to several tendencies in contemporary progressive politics, including hyper-responsibility, identity-based moral positioning, diminished attention to intent, de-historicization, and the expansion of categories of unforgivable wrongdoing. Taken together, she argued, this “produces a regressive politics of progressive guilt.”

Illouz concluded by emphasizing that remembering historical crimes such as colonialism, slavery, and Nazism remains essential. Yet a politics grounded in permanent structural guilt, she warned, risks closing off the possibility of progress itself. As an alternative, she pointed to Australia’s 2008 apology to Indigenous Australians. The apology acknowledged a specific historical wrong, affirmed a shared national community, and sought reconciliation and closure. This form of acknowledgement, Illouz argued, differed from more open-ended forms of collective guilt “because it offered a path to reconciliation as opposed to an open-ended event.” Democratic progress, she concluded, requires both accountability and remembrance, as well as the possibility of forgiveness, moral growth, and political reconciliation.

 

Leonie Schultens