
Pécs, Hungary, March 7, 2026: Hungarian politician Péter Magyar, leader of the Hungarian opposition and the Tisza Party, giving a speech.
Political scientist Julian Garritzmann on the election of Hungary’s new Prime Minister, Péter Magyar
UniReport: Prof. Garritzmann, let’s begin with a broader question. Is the electoral defeat of a prime minister whose style of government has been widely criticized as authoritarian, anti-democratic and unconstitutional a historic turning point?
Julian Garritzmann: For Hungary, without question. Orbán remained in power for several electoral cycles, during which he not only shaped the country’s political agenda but also restructured its institutions and state apparatus to serve himself and his party. He systematically curtailed the opportunities available to opposition parties to entrench his party’s dominance. The fact that he has now been voted out despite these efforts can indeed be seen as a watershed in Hungarian politics. In political science, we would describe this as a critical juncture – a decisive moment that can fundamentally alter a country’s political trajectory.
Does this mean that the seemingly unstoppable surge of such politicians in Europe has, at least for now, been halted? Or is Hungary the exception rather than the beginning of a broader trend?
I don't think this represents a turning point for Europe as a whole, nor do I expect far-right, often anti-democratic political forces to disappear as quickly as they emerged. In many countries, they have become firmly established in parliament and built a stable electoral base. They are here to stay and will remain an important political force for decades to come – not least because many center-right parties have adopted elements of the far right’s rhetoric and policy agenda, thereby contributing to their normalization.
That said, the Hungarian opposition’s victory has symbolic significance well beyond Hungary itself. Hungary represented the most extreme example of an electorally successful, openly anti-democratic and, in part, far-right governing party. Similar movements have gained strength across Europe, but only rarely have they succeeded in capturing the highest office and remaining in power for so long. In that sense, Hungary remains an exceptional case – an especially important one, but an exception nonetheless. We should therefore be cautious about drawing broad conclusions or identifying a new European trend, even if we have seen comparable developments before, for example in Poland.
At the same time, the Hungarian case demonstrates that democracies possess a degree of self-correcting capacity. Even under highly unequal conditions, where autocratic governments seek to weaken and obstruct the opposition, democratic forces can still prevail.
In your commentary, you argue that Péter Magyar is not a liberal-progressive politician but firmly rooted in the conservative camp. Could Hungary nevertheless move closer to European democratic and constitutional standards over time, leading to a gradual liberalization of conservatism under pressure from a reform-oriented, pro-European electorate?
It’s certainly possible, but I don’t consider it particularly likely. Political elites, public discourse and public attitudes can all evolve over time and become more liberal. In the 1950s and 1960s, this idea was central to modernization theory, which assumed that educational expansion, democratization, internationalization and political liberalization reinforce one another.
Empirical research, however, shows that deeply rooted values and beliefs tend to change only gradually. There are exceptions – for example, the legalization of same-sex partnerships. In such cases, political elites who broadly supported liberal reforms played a crucial role. Research suggests that this kind of political leadership can shape public opinion and bring about lasting change.
I do not currently see those conditions in Hungary. Magyar is an outspoken critic of Orbán's anti-democratic and corrupt style of government and appears considerably more open towards the European Union. But on many substantive policy issues, he differs far less from Orbán than many observers assume. He represents the values of Hungary’s predominantly conservative, rural electorate. That is why I would be surprised to see a significant shift in underlying social values in the near future.
You describe the persistence of the “Orbán system”, which continues to shape Hungarian politics and state institutions even after Orbán’s departure from office. How should Magyar proceed if he wants to dismantle these structures without provoking a backlash from those who remain deeply embedded in the system?
This will be the defining challenge of his term in office – and perhaps of any future term as well. On the one hand, he both wants and needs to draw a clear line under the Orbán era. That was one of his central campaign promises, and both Hungarian voters and European political leaders will judge him on whether he delivers.
On the other hand, he must avoid alienating the broad coalition that brought him to power. If his reforms are perceived as illegitimate or excessively radical – for example through sweeping purges of the civil service – they could provoke a backlash that would create fertile ground for populist forces, whether Orbán himself or others, to regain support. Research on democratization shows that democratic renewal is a complex process that depends on many favorable conditions: committed political leadership, broad public support, a vibrant civil society, ideally a strong economy, and international backing. There are many points at which such a process can falter.
Some observers are concerned that Magyar’s overwhelming electoral victory could itself lead to an unhealthy concentration of power, not unlike what developed under Orbán. On the other hand, a narrow victory would have left him politically vulnerable and made it far more difficult to dismantle the existing system.
That captures the dilemma precisely. Magyar needs a large and stable parliamentary majority if he is to reverse Orbán’s anti-democratic reforms. Yet that same majority inevitably carries the risk that concentrated political power could itself be abused. More broadly, this reflects a fundamental tension at the heart of every democracy. Democracies are designed both to enable majorities to govern and to protect minorities from the tyranny of the majority. The first principle favors effective political power; the second requires institutional checks and limits on that power. Balancing these competing democratic principles is a challenge in every political system. In contemporary Hungary, however, it is particularly acute.
Questions: Dirk Frank

